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Neuronomics and Rationality
Terrence Chorvat and Kevin McCabe
Abstract
The assumption of rationality is both one of the most important and most con-
troversial assumptions of modern economics. This article discusses what current
experimental economic as well as neuroscience research tells us about the rela-
tionship between rationality and the mechanisms of human decision-making. The
article explores the meaning of rationality, with a discussion of the distinction
between traditional constructivist rationality and more ecological concepts of ra-
tionality. The article argues that ecological notions of rationality more accurately
describe both human neural mechanisms as well as a wider variety of human be-
havior than do constructivist notions of rationality.
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NEUROECONOMICS AND RATIONALITY 
TERRENCE CHORVAT* & KEVIN MCCABE**
The assumption of rationality is both one of the most important and 
most controversial assumptions of modern economics. This article 
discusses what current experimental economic as well as neuroscience 
research tells us about the relationship between rationality and the 
mechanisms of human decision-making. The article explores the meaning 
of rationality, with a discussion of the distinction between traditional 
constructivist rationality and more ecological concepts of rationality. The 
article argues that ecological notions of rationality more accurately 
describe both human neural mechanisms as well as a wider variety of 
human behavior than do constructivist notions of rationality. 
INTRODUCTION 
A greater understanding of human thought processes can aid us the 
study of law in at least two ways. First, it can help us to better predict what 
will be the effect of a particular legal regime on behavior, which is of 
primary importance in deciding on the proper structure of a legal regime. 
Second, it can also help us to understand what it means improve the 
welfare of the members of society. Just as all human decision-making 
involves making estimates concerning optimality, so it must be for the 
government and its decision-making, and neuroscience can and sho
m these decisions. 
In recent years, we have learned a great deal about human decision 
making. Not only has there been an enormous amount of behavioral 
research but there has also been a large and increasing amount of research 
on the neural mechanisms involved in human decision-making. It is 
difficult to overstate the importance of this research to our understanding of 
human decision-making. Although Milton Friedman once suggested that, 
as we formulate models, the truth of the assumptions does not matter if the 
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icroscopes which we 
can use to examine the mechanisms of human decision making. 
s about rationality and the 
impo
 given the beliefs of the individual, although the 
mod
                                                          
model can predict behavior reasonably correctly,1 butas Herbert Simon 
pointed out that would only be this is a good way of thinking if we don’t 
have microscopes.2 Effectively, we do now have m
I. HUMAN DECISION-MAKING AND RATIONALITY 
One of the key problems for both economics and for the application of 
economics to legal scholarship is the extent and the nature of rationality 
exhibited by economic actors. This is one of the largest areas of 
disagreement between adherents of traditional law and economics and the 
proponents of what is often referred to as behavioral law and economics,3 
This article discusses what some of the most recent research in 
experimental economics, as well as research in neurology and the relatively 
new discipline of neuroeconomics, can tell u
rtance of rationality for legal scholarship. 
The notion of rationality creates many problems for economics and 
legal scholarship. First, it is not immediately obvious what it means to be 
rational.4 A reasonable definition would be a decision process that results 
in the selection of the “best” method of accomplishing a goal. 
Alternatively, almost any decision process which is rule-based can be 
argued to be rational.5 In addition, rationality can be applied to many 
aspects of decision-making. For example, rationality can be applied to 
belief, which forms a key part of choice behavior. If a decision maker 
ignores some pertinent evidence in forming the relevant beliefs, then one 
might term these beliefs irrational. On the other hand, one could argue that 
an action could be rational
el building process is faulty. 
The notion of rational belief is important to understanding of legal 
issues in part because reasoning about social problems generally must be 
highly opportunistic. We rarely have direct answers to those questions 
which we would most like to be answered. We can only imperfectly 
understand human behavior and the range of potential responses to 
Herbert Simon, Discussion: Problems of Methodology 53 AM. ECON. REV. 229, 230 (1962) 
 
 1. MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS(1953). 
 2. 
 3. Colin Camerer, and George Lowenstein Behvaioral Economics: Past , Present and Future in 
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (2003), 3-4. 
 4. One might view rationality to include the selection of the optimal neural mechanism, which is 
discussed infra at section II.c
 5. Such a process can be said to maximize conformity with the rules on which it is based. GARY 
S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976). 
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of legal rules.6 At best, we can claim that the process by 
whic
 of information varies, and consequently 
the decision-making processes vary? 
human behavior, such as the extent to which, as well as the ways in which, 
                                                          
particular legal regimes. Therefore, we can only make probabilistic 
predictions about that behavior which will result under differing 
combinations 
h those predictions are made may be more or less rational. 
Another inherent problem that rationality poses for legal scholarship is 
how should we address the fact that the degree of rationality found in the 
population is heterogeneous? Should we treat all individuals as equally 
rational? If most but not all individuals are rational generally rational, what 
does this mean in terms of what presumptions policymakers and judges 
should make? No agent, either individual or institutional, possesses all the 
relevant information for making decisions.7 Therefore, decisions must be 
made in the absence of perfect information. To what extent should we treat 
such agents as rational if the level
Modeling Rationality 
Those models relevant to law will generally have as their inputs 
environmental variables, and have as their outputs the behavior of 
individuals, groups of individuals, or institutions. Therefore, one might 
argue that research into neurobiology and neuroeconomics will only give 
us information that in some sense we could have learned from 
psychological or standard economic research. This argument, however, 
reflects a faulty understanding of the model-creating process. It is very 
likely that by understanding the neural mechanisms of decision-making we 
will be able to create better models of the interaction between the 
environment and human behavior. Proceeding without the insights of 
neurobiology and neuroeconomics would be rather like attempting to 
model the behavior of a car without understanding the intricacies of the 
internal combustion engine. As an understanding the oxygen requirements 
of the combustion process will serve to explain why cars do not perform as 
well at high altitude, or on cold days, research in neurobiology and 
neuroeconomics will help us resolve many conflicts over the nature of 
N. REV. 465 (2003). 
 6. A good example of this is the development of the hub and spoke system as a result of the 
deregulation of airlines in the 1970s, because the airport operators did not charge as higher fee for 
increased airport congestion. See Vernon Smith, Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in 
Economics: Nobel Prize Lecture 2002, 93 AM. ECO
 7. We do not know if the sun will explode tomorrow, or if the earth’s magnetic field will 
dissipate more quickly than anticipated. Both of these events would have a dramatic effect on our future 
plans. 
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humans are rational (which might change from individual to individual as 
well as society to society). 
One can argue that law and economics is in fact a form of applied 
psychology in that it seeks to apply a particular model of human behavior 
i.e.,  choiceto solve problems. The methodology of law and economics has 
been able to help us to answer a number of important questions because it 
is able to from precise models that create falsifiable predictions. The results 
from testing earlier predictions are then used to alter the models to cause 
them to come into greater conformity with observed behavior, both by 
revealing the likely result of particular policy prescriptions and also by 
modifying our understanding of what an optimal society might be. Here, 
the new relatively new discipline of hedonic psychology can play an 
impor
While the premises behind its normative conclusions can of course be 
questioned, it is difficult to question the usefulness of economic analysis in 
the discussion of any number of diverse issues such as optimal tax policy, 
the drug legalization debate, “three strikes” laws, or any form of economic 
regulation such as anti-trust and securities laws. It is difficult to argue that 
there is no correlation between behavior and well-being. Some of the utility 
of economic analysis derives from the fact that for many purposes, it does 
appear that for many purposes individuals can be considered rational.9  
Recall that rationality can be defined as selecting the best method of 
accomplishing a specified goal. Clearly, from an evolutionary perspective, 
pleasure and pain exist to motivate human behavior but, as research in 
cognitive neuroscience has shown, these are not the only systems which 
influence behavior and therefore it should not be surprising to us that some 
behavior appears irrational.10 One of the hallmarks of rational decision-
making is the notion that preferences, whatever they may be, are stable.11 If 
choices are random, it may difficult to refer to these choices as guided by 
preferences.12
 8. See generally WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY (Daniel 
Kahneman et al. eds., 1999). 
 9. Alvin Roth, Adaptive Behaviour and Strategic Rationality: Evidence from the Laboratory and 
the Field in THE RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR  (Kenneth Aroow et al. eds, 
1996) 
 10. Bartley G. Hoebel, Neural Systems for Reinforcement and Inhibition of Behvaior: relevance to 
Eatring, Addiction and Depression in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY ( 
Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999), 558. 
 11. ADREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY (1995). 
 12. See Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory , 70 J. Pol. Econ. 1 (1962). 
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Economists have also argued that the rationality assumption is 
reasonable even though it cannot explain all human behavior, because it 
A common defense of the rationality assumption has been that a wide 
variety of behavior can be explained by models based on this assumption. 
However, many academic commentators have discussed how predictions of 
the standard economic model do not seem to be borne out in either 
experiments with individuals or in the econometric data.13 A number of 
academics have argued that, in fact, individuals systematically deviate from 
standard notions of rationality.14 This work is sometimes referred to as 
behavioral economics, but is more accurately thought of as economics with 
an empirical focus.  Note that many of these examples cited in this 
literature are not merely violations of expected utility in a manner similar 
to the Allais paradox or the Ellsberg paradox, which can be rationalized 
through the use of complex risk preferences,15 but rather violate notions of 
rationality altogether. In the face of such evidence, psychologists such as 
Amos Tversky have questioned why economists have such reluctance to 
give up the rationality hypothesis in the face of such strong evidence.16
Many economists argue that we can gain some level of confidence for 
the view that the realism of the assumptions does not matter from the fact 
that often other disciplines such as physics make unrealistic assumptions.17 
Indeed, if this is the case, reference to other disciplines might indicate how 
these models might be useful in a variety of ways. Other disciplines often 
use mathematical forms of optimization even where almost no one is 
hypothesizing that some actual choice process is occurring. physicists often 
use optimization methods in studying physical systems yet, except for a 
very small fringe group, physicists do not assume that the physical systems 
at issue are in any real sense part of a decision-making process.18 
Economists have long acknowledged that rational models are not the only 
ways in which individuals exhibit choice behavior. In essence, many 
macroeconomic models actually assume certain levels of irrationality.19
                                                          
 13. See Camerer and Lowenstein, supra note 
 14. For an early example of this work, see K.O. May Intransitivity, Utility and the Aggregation of 
Preference Patterns 22 ECONOMETRICA 1 (1954). 
 15. See description in Terrence Chorvat, Taxing Utility, forthcoming in the Journal of 
ctive Choice in THE RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
. eds, 1996). 
YNMAN, 1 THE FEYNMAN LECTURES ON PHYSICS, 26-3(1970).for a description of the 
eth Arrow, Rationality of Self and Others_-J. OF BUS.__ (1986). 
SOCIOECONOMICS (2005). 
 16. Amos Tversky, Rational and Constru
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR (Kenneth Arrow et al
 17. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at __. 
 18. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (2nd ed., 1983). See 
RICHARD P. FE
least time principle. 
 19. Kenn
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can 
terminology, the first category of models of economic 
behavior are the risk ne a thThis may be viewed 
as the very first model  esigned to explain the 
valu
                                                          
be used to predict much of human behavior. This was form of Alvin 
Roth’s response to Amos Tversky’s argument against the rationality 
hypothesis. Roth argues that the applicability of rational models depends on 
the level of analysis required for the problem.20 Roth divided the levels of 
analysis into standard economic models (further subdivided into risk-
neutral models and expected utility models), psychological models, and 
neurobiological models. One could further divide neurobiological models 
into those models that address the interactions between larger neural 
mechanism ( – for example, certain models address how the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex appears to process data in a manner different than the 
insula cortex)21  – versus biochemical models (for example, certain models  
address how higher levels of serotonin lead to less impulsive behavior 
because of the lower levels of activation in various cortical neural 
circuits).22 Research on these two types sis isof a different sort and, while 
clearly connected, they yields different types of results. The 
raityassumption would seem to be more to the models which involve larger 
scale process (e.g., the agent as a whole) than to those models which 
address the electrochemical changes is the cells that make up the brain 
1. The Risk Neutral Model 
Using Roth’s 
utr l models. Rs of their weal
 for utility theory, as it was d
e of various gambles and why individuals are likely to take certain 
gambles and not take other gambles. The risk neutral model posited that 
individuals act so as to maximize their expected value. This theory was 
formulated by Fermat and Pascal in the late 1600’s. Soon after its 
formation, problems with the model were discovered.23 The most famous 
of these problems is known as the St. Petersburg Paradox, which was 
“solved” by Daniel Bernoulli through the creation of an antecedent of 
expected utility theory.24
 20. Alvin Roth, Adaptive Behaviour and Strategic Rationality: Evidence from the Laboratory and 
the Field in THE RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds, 1996) 
 21. See Alan G. Sanfey et al., The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum 
Game, 300 SCI. 1755, 1755-58 (2003). 
S S  (2002) 286-8. 
 
urement of Risk, 22 ECONOMETRICA 23 (1952).  The St. Petersburg paradox involves a gamble 
 
 22. JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE YNAPTIC ELF
 23. See Terrence R. Chorvat, Ambiguity and Income Taxation, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 617, 620-22 
(2003). 
 24. Daniel Bernoulli, Specimen Theoriae Novae de Mensura Sortis, 5 COMMENTARII ACADEMIAE
SCIENTIARUM IMPERIALIS PETROPOLITANAE 175 (1738), translated in Exposition of a New Theory on 
the Meas
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er developments of Bernoulli’s ideas, a new model 
of human behavior – the  
model for econom
s developed more recently can be 
described as “almost ls resemble expected 
utility
                                                                                                                                     
2. Expected Utility Models 
As a result of furth
expected utility model – became the standard
ic analysis. This second family of models has more 
explanatory power regarding behavior than the first, including why 
individuals purchase insurance, why stocks have a higher return than 
bonds, et cetera.25 Models based on the assumptions of expected utility 
theory have also been used to explain the pricing of assets, both real and 
financial. These models form the backbone of what can be referred to as 
both neoclassical economics and traditional law and economics. These 
theories form the basis for game theory, price theory, and the rational 
expectations models of macroeconomics.26 Interestingly, while the more 
recent expected utility models are able to explain a greater variety of 
behavior, there still remain many applications of risk neutral models in 
economics. For example, many argue that corporate managers should be 
essentially risk-neutral in their decision-making, because shareholders can 
diversify away most of the idiosyncratic risk of any corporation.27 
Furthermore some economists have argued that the government should 
essentially act in risk-neutral manner.28
3. “Almost Rational” Models 
Another type of model which ha
rational” models.29 These mode
 models in many respects, but add the assumptions that individuals 
may have more complicated risk preferences, and may not ignore sunk 
costsIn many versions of these models, the reference points of the agents 
significantly affect the predicted behavior. One can still call such persons 
 
nd Marshall Sarnat, Diversification, Portfolio Analysis and the Uneasy 
iour and Strategic Rationality: 
vi
with an infinite expected value for which individuals are only willing to pay a modest amount.  For a 
description of the St. Petersburg paradox see Chorvat, supra note 23, at 620-22. 
 25. Alvin Roth, Adaptive Behaviour and Strategic Rationality: Evidence from the Laboratory and 
the Field in THE RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds, 1996) 
 26. ROBERT E. LUCAS, JR. MODELS OF BUSINESS CYCLES (1987). 
 27. Alvin Haim Levy a
Case for Conglomerate Mergers, 27 J. FIN. 795 (1970)Adaptive Behav
E dence from the Laboratory and the Field in THE RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC 
BEHAVIOUR (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds, 1996) 
 28. Kenneth J. Arrow & Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment 
Decisions, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 364 (1970). 
 29. Alvin E Roth, Bargaining Experiments, in T  OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS349 (John H. 
Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995). 
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4. Psychological Models 
Another family o t be described as 
psyc
5. Neurobiological Models 
The final type of m  we should consider 
are t
                                                          
rational although they may have seemingly complicated views of risk.30 
These models include a variety of non-expected utility theories.31
f behavioral models migh
hological models. These models do not posit stable preferences 
functions, but rather a set of psychological processes which interact with 
the environment to create behavior.32 One could argue that in some sense 
that even these models are constitute examples of economic models as 
well. The actors in these models are various psychological needs, instead of 
individuals of standard economic models, and how the action of the 
individual is decided upon depends on the internal dynamic between these 
psychological needs. One can analogize these models to economic theories 
of group interactions.  These models allow for preference reversals, just as 
social choice theory shows that group decision making will not always lead 
to consistent choices.33 Even these psychological models essentially 
assume some rationality principle, in that there is some choice process 
behind the various psychological processes and, to the extent that this is 
rule based, it too can be rationalized. 
odel for human behavior which
he neurobiological model. These models are based not on preferences 
or psychological processes, but rather on the physical processes of 
decision-making. In some sense, these represent the height of rationalizable 
models, because physical processes follow deterministic rules until on 
arrives at the quantum level.34 There are a variety of these types of models.  
Two prominent types of these models are first models which address the 
interactions between different brain regions, and second the models which 
address the underlying neurochemistry of decisions. Much of the research 
in this field is conducted on particular areas of brain activation during 
decision-making, as well as research on a more microscopic level. 
escription of these models see Colin Camerer, Individual Decision-Making in THE 
A
idence from the Laboratory and 
DATIONS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds, 1996) 
TURES ON PHYSICS, 37-11 (1970). 
 30. Matthew Rabin & Richard Thaler, Risk Aversion 15 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 219, 221 (2001). 
 31. For a d
H NDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 626-651 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995). 
 32. Alvin Roth, Adaptive Behaviour and Strategic Rationality: Ev
the Field in THE RATIONAL FOUN
 33. DAVID KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 174-81(1990) 
 34. For a discussion of the impact of quantum mechanics of the determinism of the classical 
Newtonian physics, see RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, 1 THE FEYNMAN LEC
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art29
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dictions. 
It is indeed important y 
appropriate to explain the par t issue. One of the keys of 
scien
II. ECOLOGICAL VERSUS CONSTRUCTIVIST RATIONALITY 
An  
mod
revealing the changes to neurons and glial cells that occur as the result of 
certain events in the brain. Carried to their logical extreme, for example, 
these models might reveal that the reason a particular decision was made 
was a change in the membrane permeability in certain neuronal and glial 
cells. 
At the current time, it seems rather far-fetched for economists to 
calculate the effects of a 20% versus 25% income tax rate on neuronal 
membrane permeability in various regions of the brain. While such models 
might eventually attain this level of accuracy, nonetheless, at least 
currently, these results would essentially be impractical and would include 
too many degrees of freedom to yield helpful pre
to understand that level of rationalit
ticular behavior a
ce is the creation of falsifiable hypotheses. If a model can always 
accommodate all factual evidence, then it is non-falsifiable and therefore 
non-scientific.35 Because there are so many differing models for human 
behavior, a key problem arises in that one can always ex post choose the 
model to best fit the data rather than ex ante predicting what the data 
should be. For example, if individuals behave rationally, we might use 
rational models; if they don’t, we use psychological or neurobiological 
models. Picking and choosing of models ex post in this fashion is 
unsatisfactory. We should rather develop a meta model for deciding when 
to use rational models, psychological models, or whatever models we 
eventually develop. This is particularly true given that, in some sense, 
psychological and neurobiological models are more in the nature of 
catalogues of decision-processes rather than over-arching models of 
decision-making. Future models which incorporate neurobiological 
research must be able to predict the behaviors that are more likely to be 
better approximated by rational models and those that are more likely to be 
better approximated by non-rational models. The models should both 
explain the diversity of human behavior and yet predict what will 
commonly happen. 
other of the problems with the argument against using rational
els as predictive of human behavior is that it is assumes only one type 
of rationality, commonly referred to as constructivist rationality. 
                                                          
 35. KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1934). 
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 rationality. It is important to 
disti
likely of an ecological 
natu
                                                          
Constructivist rationality is based on the rationality utilized by Descartes in 
trying to deduce morality and rules of decision-making from a small set of 
first principles.36 One can see this type of rationality played out to a great 
extent in modern game theory, which assumes a relatively small set of 
axioms about the utility of the players and deduces an enormous number of 
findings of great complexity.37
But this is not the only form of
nguish constructivist rationality from ecological rationality. Ecological 
rationality is not rational in the sense that it concerns a set of decision rules 
that are able to predict what should happen in each situation, or that it will 
necessarily give the optimal path to the solution that we can see would 
have been optimal ex post.38 Rather ecological rationality results in optimal 
decision rules given the costs of making the decision and the neurological 
mechanisms available to the decision-maker. This is related to constrained 
optimization, under which the cost of obtaining new information is 
included in the decision constraints. As with bounded rationality, the 
decision rules created by ecological rationality may not be rational for all 
possible states of the world, but they might be rational in states of the world 
that are likely to occur. This view is more likely to reflect neurological 
reality than are constructivist notions of rationality. 
Not only is individual decision-making more 
re, but one can argue that governmental decision-making should be of 
this variety as well. Just as individuals who are able to learn about their 
environment are more likely to survive, institutions which are able to adapt 
and change are more likely to survive, and therefore over time are more 
likely to comprise a higher proportion of the institutions we see.39 Even 
though no one person may understand why an institution has survived, it 
will have survived because it was better able to adapt to situations than 
other institutions, just as crocodiles do not understand why their kind has 
survived since before the time of the dinosaurs. 
 36. See generally, RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURS DE LA METHODE POUR BIEN CONDUIRE SA 
 (1668) 
d Ecological Rationality in Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 
5
Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory,58 J. POL. ECON. 211 (1950). 
RAISON, & CHERCHER LA VERITÉ DANS LES SCIENCES. PLUS LA DIOPTRIQUE, LES METEORES, LA 
MECHANIQUE, ET LA MUSIQUE, QUI SONT DES ESSAIS DE CETTE METHODE
 37. ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT (1997). 
 38. Vernon Smith, Constructivist an
46  (2003). 
 39. 
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” make. 
A. Game Theory and Constructivist Rationality 
Decision theory is the study of how individuals make decisions.40 
When these decisions are strategic – that is, where the behavior of each 
agent affects decisions made by the others – this study is called game 
theory.41 In classical game theory, games are employed as a metaphor for 
strategic decision-making by economic actors in situations where choices 
by each affect decisions by the others. One can argue that mathematical 
decision theory and mathematical game theory give the normatively 
“correct” answers to problems. However, in real world situations the 
“right” answers might depend on the actual actions of others who may not 
be game theorists, and so therefore it is important also to understand the 
decisions humans actually make, not just those they “should
Very commonly individuals do not behave as predicted by game 
theory.42 This may be for reasons of cognitive limitations, or it may be 
because of other reasons which are more difficult to describe but involve 
social cognition and group dynamics. 
B. Adaptive Learning 
One of the most common tests of rationality is the ability to avoid 
what is referred to as a “Dutch book.” A “Dutch book” is a mechanism by 
which a series of bargains are placed before a subject, and while each of the 
bargains is favorable to the subject yet, at the end of the series, the subject 
has no money and nothing to show for it.43 Because we do not observe 
many Dutch books in the real world, nor does it seem that rational persons 
would permit a Dutch book to operate against them, this has become one of 
the standard tests of rationality. It can be demonstrated that, were a robot 
endowed with many of the standard utility functions of human beings, they 
would be subject to the Dutch book argument.44 Why then don’t we see 
Dutch books in the real world? 
                                                          
 40. Peter Gärdenfors and Nils-Eric Sahlin, Introduction: Bayesian Decision Theory: Foundations 
and Problems in DECISION, PROBABILITY AND UTILITY: SELECTED READING, 3-4 (Peter Gärdenfors and 
, COLIN CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY (2003) 
Nils-Eric Sahlin, eds, 1988) 
 41. KREPS, supra note _. At 355 
 42. See generally
 43. See Menahem E. Yaari, The Role of Dutch Books in the Theory of Choice in FRONTIERS OF 
RESEARCH IN ECONOMIC THEORY: THE NANCY L SCHWARTZ MEMORIAL LECTURES 1983-1997(Donald 
Jacobs et al. eds, 1998). 
 44. Rabin, and Thaler 
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xperiments discussed as disproving rationality might 
be b
behavioral and neurological research indicates that learning 
occu
 
ratio
Dutch books do not work because people learn not to let others take 
advantage of them.45 One can see how learning based models may be both 
better predictors of behavior, and in some sense are to be preferred over the 
strict expected utility models. For example, it may be optimal for a group 
of individuals to allow each member to experiment individually and then 
after some period of time the members of the group could begin to imitate 
others who have succeeded.46 From an evolutionary perspective, one can 
see how agents who adopt the imitation of the success of others as a basic 
strategy might succeed in wide variety of environments. This concept is 
connected with the notion that we do not need to understand every aspect 
of a principle in order to understand how it can be used.47
Therefore, the e
etter thought of as disproving constructivist rationality.48 With some 
introspection, we should not be surprised that individuals who are not 
trained as statisticians will make significant mistakes in their decisions.  
This does not mean that individual cannot make correct decisions about 
questions that involve statistical inference, but rather the method by which 
these decisions are made may not reach the normatively correct answer in 
all cases. 
Both 
rs in very complex frameworks, not merely simple Hebbian 
association or “selectionist” models.49 Explanations of human decision-
making based on evolutionary psychology et cetera are fascinating and 
helpful but, ultimately, scientific knowledge and models must flow from 
experimental or other empirical evidence, rather than introspection alone. 
Focusing on ecological rationality as opposed to constructivist
nality may cause us to realize that there is no real substitute for the 
careful study of natural environments. Were economists to attempt to 
understand market behavior without studying real behavior (for example, in 
the case of the St. Petersberg paradox50 and insurance), we might not have 
been inspired to create the expected utility models in place of the expected 
value models. Economic models generally assume tastes are both 
                                                          
 45. Rabin and Thaler, supra note x At. 
 46. Roth, supra note x at. 
supra note 23, at 4-1. 
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en Theoriae Novae de Mensura Sortis, 5 COMENTARII 
8), translated in 
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 47. FEYNMAN, 
 48. For example, the experiments condu
some type of ecological rationality 
 49. For a discussion of Hebbian models, See LEDOUX, supra note _ at 80-81. 
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exogenous and stable.51 We assume that when choices are made which are 
different than previous choices, rationality has been violated. It is of course 
always possible that preferences have changed. If we were to allow 
preference changes to commonly enter into our explanations, we would 
almost never be able to falsify a theory, thus removing it from a Popperian 
notion of science.52 Without a good theory of how tastes change, we cannot 
allow these consideration to enter the models. 
Where psychological models and neurobiological models might be 
particularly helpful is in enabling us to elucidate how tastes are formed. 
This may help to explain paradoxes such as Tversky’s Williams-Sonoma 
catalog example (the existence of a third alternative will cause more 
purchases of the one of two previous available alternatives, et cetera).53 
Research in both psychology and neurology with likely be very helpful in 
explaining the effectiveness of advertising, as well as phenomena such as 
the degree of trust and trustworthiness of members of different societies. 
One reasonable hypothesis about the behavior of subjects in experiments in 
different societies is that we are seeing artifacts of their behavior in the 
world. This notion is buoyed up by recent research which seems to indicate 
that members of different societies often adopt different strategies in simple 
experimental situations.54 However, one must consider that one of the 
possible effects of the double blind study might be to make clear to the 
subjects that the standard rules of society do not apply. 
Many researchers in human behavior and biology have adopted an 
approach, referred to as cognitive neuroscience, which integrates 
psychology, biochemistry, neurology, evolutionary biology and related 
sciences in order to further our understanding of human behavior.55 One 
problem with such interdisciplinary efforts is coordinating the different 
methods of inquiry. Grossly oversimplifying, biological sciences follow 
more of a cataloguing approach (e.g., this behavior is correlated with this 
neural mechanisms), whereas economics attempts to create models which 
predict a wide variety of behavior with very simple 
supra note 24 
 Constructive Choice in THE RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
t al. eds, 1996) 
 51. We say this noting the exception of models such as Becker’(see Gary Becker et al., Rational 
Addiction and the Effect of Price on Consumption 81 AM. ECON. REV. 237 (1991) )and derivatives of it. 
 52. POPPER, 
 53. Amos Tversky, Rational and
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR (Kenneth Arrow e
 54. Joseph Henrich et al., In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-
Scale Societies 91 AM. ECON. REV. 73 (2001) 
 55. MICHAEL GAZZINGA, RICHARD IVRY, & GEORGE MAGNUN, COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE (2nd, 
ed. 2002) 
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One of the problems with the cataloging method, which has been the 
dominant paradigm in the neurological research, is that it fails to predict 
new behavior. The opposite problem can be argued applies to economics 
with its assumption of rationality. The rationality hypothesis is quite 
resilient when there is only a finite amount of data (as long as it complies 
with the weak axiom of revealed preference).56 One can analogize some of 
the results of economic analysis to the famous experiments in which split-
brain patients were able to rationalize what they did not understand, even 
while it was clear that the rationalization was incorrect.57
It has long been hypothesized that biological mechanisms can have 
direct control of our behavior in particular areas.58 Merely understanding 
that there may be genetic influences on behavior does not tell us how this 
behavior is created, nor how the mechanism utilized for one problem may 
influence other types of behavior. Cognitive neuroscience can help us to 
resolve these questions by directly examining the neural mechanisms 
involved. As pointed out by Joseph LeDoux, the link between the brain and 
behavior is much, much stronger than the link between genetics and 
behavior.59
C. Ecological Rationality and Neurological Mechanisms 
For a variety of reasons, including those discussed above, 
constructivist rationality seems unlikely as a paradigm of behavior, 
particularly given what we know about neurological mechanisms. 
Constructivist rationality seems rather based on forethought about future 
states with precise payoffs. Neurological research shows us that there are 
many different regions of the brain which process information differently. 
This section will discuss some areas of research which explore how this 
compartmentalization occurs. In particular, it will examine research which 
examines differences between conscious and unconscious process, 
differences between personal and impersonal decision and finally some 
interesting work on the ultimatum game. 
1. The Cost of Conscious Awareness 
Neurological research indicates that cognition is a costly resource. 
Because brains are finite, and because there is a payoff to increasing our 
 56. MAS COLELL ET AL., supra note_ at 12. 
 57. GAZZANIGA, ET AL., SUPRA NOTE_, AT 436-37. 
 58. Id. at 62-95. 
 59. LEDOUX, supra note 16, at 3-5. 
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understanding of the world, the constraints on the capabilities of our brains 
can seriously affect the manner in which functions are performed.60 Most 
of the brain does not seem to be directly involved in conscious processes.61 
Two key questions are, then, how does the brain decide which problems it 
will address and, once this selection has been made, what neural 
mechanisms are used to solve the problem? It appears that the answers are 
governed by rules similar to those which economists and operations 
research specialists use in their optimization calculations. In particular, it 
appears that the brain consists of modules which solve particular kinds of 
problems.62 There are clear evolutionary advantages to this. Individuals are 
confronted with a finite, although very large, set of problems. Solving the 
specific problems presented and having tissues structured for solving those 
problems would be more efficient than having general purpose tissues 
which would likely be more costly and not as well adapted.63
Because there are a nearly infinite number of stimuli in the world at 
any given time, in order to focus on any object, we must decide to ignore 
some stimuli and focus on others. Even after we are aware of a “problem,” 
we have many potential mechanisms to use to address the issues raised. For 
example, we may react impulsively or we may calculate the optimal 
decision. Research in cognitive neuroscience suggests that different 
methods of problem solving are located in different parts of the brain. An 
example of this can be found in the fact that, patients with damage to the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (PFC) are unlikely to exhibit emotional 
responses to stimuli, whereas those patients with dorsolateral PFC damage 
appear to have problems in cognitive processing of tasks that do not seem 
to evoke emotional processing (for example, the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
tasks).64 Interestingly, both types of reasoning seem to be necessary for 
optimal problem solving. Because of cognitive limitations, it is not the case 
that one should always use either cognitive processing (or more 
 60. Herbert Simon, Bounded Rationality, in THE NEW PALGRAVE 266-286 (J. Eatwell et al. eds., 
 
ontal Cortex: Processing and Representational 
 the Human Cerebral 
, & GEORGE R. MANGUN, COGNITIVE 
1987). 
 61. GAZZANIGA, ET AL., SUPRA NOTE_, AT 660-68.
 62. J. N. Wood & Jordan Grafman, Human Prefr
Perspectives, 4 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 139-147 (2003). 
 63. P. E. Roland and K. Zilles, Structural Division and Functional Fields in
Cortex 26 BRAIN RESEARCH REVIEWS 87-105 (1998). 
 64. MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, RICHARD IVRY
NEUROSCIENCE: THE BIOLOGY OF THE MIND (2nd ed., 2002); The Wisconsin Card Sorting Task 
involves sorting cards which have objects on them which vary along three dimensions: shape, color, and 
number. The cards are to be sorted according to a method determined by the experimenter, but not 
explicitly told to the subjects. The subjects learn the rule by trial an error, via feedback from the 
experimenter as to whether a particularly sorting is in accord with the rule or if it violates it. 
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e control over our state of mind as well as our actions.65
colloquially “logic”) or affective processing (more colloquially “emotion”) 
which has been conditioned by evolutionary pressures to punish or reward 
behavior. Because of these conflicts, and the lack of inherent superiority of 
one mechanism over the other, there needs to be some mechanism to 
resolve these conflicts. A significant amount of research now focuses on 
how this resolution occurs. The goal of this research is to discover how we 
maintain cognitiv
One region of the brain which is clearly involved in cognitive conflict 
resolution is the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). This area is currently 
thought to be involved in registering a conflict between regions. Some 
researchers argue that after a conflict is recognized, various areas of the 
PFC included the ACC also become active and the choice of regions 
activated depends on the cognitive requirements of the problem 
presented.66 In addition, the context in which the problem is presented may 
have a significant impact on the mechanism used to address the problem.67
Some economists have argued that even self-destructive behaviors can 
best be modeled as conscious rational choices.68 Others, generally 
psychologists, argue that these behaviors are the result of lack of control, 
these individuals did not set out to become criminals or addicts, but the 
behaviors are the results of cognitive or emotional deficits. Both sides have 
significant evidence for their arguments. To the extent these discoveries are 
conscious, it is clear that the law can affect them. However, to the extent 
that they are unconscious, the ability of law to alter them is less clear. 
The extent to which processes are conscious or unconscious may have 
a significant effect on legal questions. For example, to what extent should 
law attempt to alter unconscious processing in addition to conscious 
processes? To what extent can it affect these processes? This is a question 
that future research will have to answer. 
2. The Effects of Personal Interaction 
There has been a fair amount of research which analyzes the different 
brain regions activated by personal as opposed to impersonal interactions. 
One example of this is research on the neural mechanisms involved in the 
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reactions of subjects to standard hypothetical moral dilemmas that involve 
personal and impersonal decision-making.69 While using fMRI technology 
to image the brains of the subjects, they asked a number of questions, 
including a thought experiment regarding how the subjects would respond 
if faced with a moral dilemma with the following facts. Subjects are told 
that a train is coming down a track and, if they do nothing, the train will hit 
a car on the track and five people will be killed but, alternatively, if they 
press a button, the train will be diverted to a side track and only one person 
will be killed.70 As has been known for many years, most people report that 
they would choose to press the button.71 Interestingly, the response is quite 
different if a similar, but slightly different, situation is presented. In this 
second moral dilemma, the subjects would have to push the person next to 
them onto the track, killing them.72 Here, most people answer they would 
not do that. The study shows that the parts of the brain that are actively 
involved in the decision to push the person are similar to those involved in 
fear and grief.73 The decision to flip the switch, which would also result in 
killing a human, involved far fewer emotional reactions. In particular, the 
areas more likely to be active in personal moral dilemmas – such as 
pushing the person on to the tracks – were areas of the medial frontal gyrus, 
the posterior cingulate gyrus, and the bilateral superior temporal sulcus 
(STS). These areas are normally involved in social-emotional processing.74 
The non-moral or impersonal dilemmas (e.g., switching the train track) 
tend to activate areas in the dorsolateral PFC and the parietal cortex 
(normally involved in calculation) and executive function.76 For those 
subjects who did decide to push the person next to them, one might argue 
that “logic” or cognitive processes prevailed over “emotion”. Interestingly, 
those who did decide to push the other person took significantly longer in 
making this decision than those who chose not to push the other person (a 
difference of 5 seconds for those who would not push the person versus 
6.75 for those who would). There was very little difference between the 
                                                          
 69. See Joshua Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment, 
e and Jonathon Haidt, How and Where Does Moral Judgment Work, 6 TRENDS 
 C
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mak
                                                          
brain activation or decision time between impersonal moral dilemmas and 
non-moral dilemmas (less than ½ of second). This would tend to indicate 
that the more impersonal the decision becomes, the more we can be 
“rational” or rather adopt what one might argue are socially optimal 
decision making mechanisms. This suggests that certain types of moral 
decision making involves a fair amount of social thinking and invokes 
notions of positive and negative reciprocity, and personalization. Other 
more recent experiments confirm that the regions of the brain involved in 
moral processing are also the same regions used in social cognition.77 One 
recent study by Moll et al. attempted to separate out the regions involved in 
moral judgments as opposed to those involved in emotional processing. 
They found that moral situations differentially activated the STS and the 
OFC.78 One key distinction between this experiment and the Greene 
experiment is th
ing decisions about how to behave. 
Consistent with these experiments as well as many others, it appears 
that the method of reasoning changes depending on the nature of the 
problem presented. This may have many applications for our understanding 
of law and the legal system. For example, in attempting to understand how 
juries reach the decisions they do, we can see that individuals may make 
socially-optimal choices more when they keep the subject of the decision at 
a distance. If the decision is personalized in some way, this can in and of 
itself alter the decision. Of course, more work needs to be done to fully 
understand what kinds of situations result in personalization and the precise 
way in which reasoning processes differ between personal and impersonal 
situations. To the extent that the conclusions from these experiments bear 
up in further experiments, society may have an interest in depersonalizing 
problems that are presented to decision-makers. In addition, objectivity 
may require more than simply not being related or having a direct stake in 
the outcome. These and other experiments suggest that even having to face 
someone is enough to invoke personal and social triggers.80 This research 
may also indicate that society needs to frame interactions so that the 
“personalization” will result in actions that are in accord with what is 
Jorge Moll et al., Functional Networks in Emotional Moral and Nonmoral Social Judgments 
 Goods in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS (John Kagel 
. 
 77. Jorge Moll et al., The Neural Correlates of Moral Sensitivity: A Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging Investigation of Basic and Moral Emotions 22 J. OF NEUROSCIENCE 2730 (2002). 
 78. 
16 NEUROIMAGE 696 (2002). 
 80. John Ledyard, Public
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ividuals personalize problems 
whe
 one of the key questions for understanding 
the impact of law on behav
whenever actions against the subject’s 
imm
0 split). These latter splits are commonly rejected by the 
seco
                                                          
socially optimal, rather than being in conflict with it (e.g., attempt to utilize 
personalization to obtain optimal cooperation). One hopes that further 
research in this area will examine how ind
n the stakes to personalization are high. 
It appears that moral reasoning is spread across many neural 
mechanisms81 and how any particular problem is resolved appears to 
depend on the interaction of these mechanisms. It appears that any moral 
problem may be approached in a very different manner than another that 
may appear to be similar to our conscious minds. Therefore, an important 
line of future research is the attempt to understand the mechanisms by 
which problems are interpreted. In particular, how problems become 
perceived as social and how at other times problems can be interpreted as 
“simply” cognitive problems is
ior. 
3. The Ultimatum Game 
Many of the mechanisms used by the brain to deal with situations of 
cognitive conflict are illustrated in the ultimatum game. The neurological 
studies of how players in this game make decisions illustrate the 
mechanisms the brain uses to resolve the conflict between deciding 
whether to accept money (something generally desired) but, at the same 
time, also accepting what individuals are likely to view as an unfair 
bargain, or choosing to reject the money and enforce fairness. Similar 
mechanisms appear to be invoked 
ediate self-interest are chosen. 
The ultimatum game is a two-player game in which the first player is 
given a stake and is told to divide it between the two players. After the first 
player has decided, the second player can then choose to accept the 
division, or to reject the division. If the second player rejects the division, 
both player get nothing. It is fairly common for the proposed division to be 
a 50/50 split. However, many time the first player will propose an unfair 
split (e.g., a 90/1
nd player.82
One experiment on the neural mechanisms involve in the decision of 
the second players found that those players who rejected “unfair” offers 
 81. William Casebeer & Patricia Churchland, The Neural Mechanisms of Moral Cognition: A 
mulitple- Aspect Approach to Moral Judgment and Decision-Making 18 BIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY 
169-194 (2003). 
 82. See CAMERER, supra note 42 at 8-12. 
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ard signaling. Therefore it 
should not come as 
strategies to pro
ecessarily yield the 
corre
economic theory predicts.  It might very well be the case that these models 
                                                          
had much higher activation in the insula cortex, than those who accepted 
these offers. On the other hand, those who accepted these offers had higher 
activations in the dorsolateral prefronta
CC was also significantly active.83
As the Sanfey et al. experiment shows, different brain regions (such as 
the insula and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) seem to embody different 
thought processes.84 To some extent the ACC seems to moderate between 
these different regions depending on the situation. The neurological 
mechanism would appear to be more consistent with an ecological 
approach to be more consistent with an ecological approach to rationality. 
That is, individuals have a variety of mechanisms which adopt different 
approaches to problems. These approaches are then mediated by neural 
mechanisms, which are likely based on rew
surprise that individuals adopt seemingly “irrational” 
blems. 
4. Ecological Rationality and Economics 
Neurological research seems to indicate that the brain has different 
decision-making mechanisms which often lead to different decisions. This 
would not seem to be in accord with constructivist notions of rationality, 
which imply only one type of decision-making mechanism. Far from being 
problematic, this actually allows for a more ecological approach to 
decision-making, where different approaches are considered before the best 
solution is selected. This kind of decision-making works best when not 
every decision concerns life or death, but rather merely increases or 
decreases the likelihood of survival in some understandable way. If it is not 
possible to guess ahead of time what mode will n
ct decision, it may be more productive to be able to generate a variety 
of different strategies and later determine which might work best. 
In addition, ecological rationality is not necessarily antithetical to 
many of the prediction of traditional economics. A large portion of 
standard economic results are of type referred to as comparative static 
results, i.e. what will occur at equilibrium. Ecological rationality models 
indicate that the comparative statics of boundedly rational actors will often 
result in efficient outcomes, in fact possibly more efficient than standard 
 83. See generally Alan G. Sanfey et al., The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the 
Ultimatum Game, 300 SCI. 1755, 1755-57 (2003) (explaining the neural mechanisms involved with 
regard to inequality aversion). 
 84. Id. 
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d equilibria arise, rather than in the 
char
ped by a relatively small number of individuals, but have now been 
adopted world-wide. 
th environmental and neurological, in which these decision are 
made. 
depart from the predictions of constructivist rationality more in the 
dynamics of how the predicte
acteristics of these equilbria. 
When problems are particularly hard for individuals to solve, we often 
create institutions to deal with these problems. Consider for example the 
institutional forms of corporations or governments. These do not really 
exist as physical entities but are merely mechanisms which we have 
adopted in order to more easily account for certain actions given our 
cognitive mechanisms.  These are examples of institutions that were 
develo
CONCLUSION 
Current empirical research on decision-making indicates that there are 
important ways in which individuals do not conform to standard economic 
models. However, it would be a mistake to conclude from this that 
individuals should be labeled irrational. In fact, the research indicates that 
individuals who are behaving irrationally under constructivist notions of 
rationality are often behaving consistently with ecological notions of 
rationality. However, much more work needs to be done to understand the 
precise nature of human decision-making. This research need to consider 
context, bo
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